Anne Jeffrey, GOD AND MORALITY by Lipscomb, Benjamin J. Bruxvoort
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 37 Issue 3 Article 9 
7-1-2020 
Anne Jeffrey, GOD AND MORALITY 
Benjamin J. Bruxvoort Lipscomb 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Lipscomb, Benjamin J. Bruxvoort (2020) "Anne Jeffrey, GOD AND MORALITY," Faith and Philosophy: 
Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 37 : Iss. 3 , Article 9. 
DOI: 10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.3.9 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol37/iss3/9 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and 
creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
380 Faith and Philosophy
God and Morality, by Anne Jeffrey. Cambridge University Press, 2019. 
Pp. 84. $18 (paperback).
BENJAMIN J. BRUXVOORT LIPSCOMB, Houghton College
I haven’t read anything quite like Anne Jeffrey’s God and Morality before. 
It’s a new entry in the Cambridge Elements series, the aim of which is 
to provide “concise and structured introductions to . . . central topics in 
the philosophy of religion” as a resource for academics. Contributors to 
the series are also charged to develop “new ideas and arguments from a 
unique viewpoint.”
The book is less objectively novel than it was novel to me. Books of this 
kind (“guides,” “very short introductions”) are now ubiquitous, and play 
a vital role in helping academics get up to speed on topics ancillary to their 
main areas of scholarship and teaching. I knew such books were out there; 
I just haven’t made use of them yet.
It is important to stress the genre of God and Morality, lest one hold it 
to the wrong standard. I mean no criticism of Jeffrey’s coverage or rigor, 
both of which are impressive. She is (as one would expect) more conver-
sant with the arguments she canvasses than most readers will be. She is 
more conversant with many of these arguments than I am. Having said 
that: part of Jeffrey’s assignment was to condense a vast swath of schol-
arly debate into just under 70 pages (the official page count—84—includes 
front and back matter and a bibliography). One needs only consider the 
project in those terms to appreciate the challenge she faced—and to pre-
dict the density of the resulting exposition.
God and Morality is divided into three main sections: on God and nor-
mativity, God and moral epistemology, and God and moral motivation. 
Each section then deals with a major metaethical domain in which some 
philosophers have thought that theism “makes a difference” (1). The pur-
ported difference usually has apologetic import: theism is supposed to 
ground normativity better than alternative views, or provide the most 
compelling response to evolutionary debunking arguments, or better 
underwrite moral hope. For each domain, Jeffrey contends that “thin the-
ism’—roughly, the bare idea of an “omniGod’—has less difference-mak-
ing power than the “thicker,” more specified theisms one encounters in 
historic religious traditions. The constructive argument of the book, then, 
is a cumulative-case argument: by highlighting repeatedly the philosoph-
ical consequences of beliefs about (say) the character of God, Jeffrey hopes 
to persuade her readers not to set aside “substantive assumptions about 
divine attributes or action” (63). It is these substantive assumptions on 




which some of the most important questions in the philosophy of religion 
turn. Whose God?, Jeffrey prods us to ask; which divinity?
In keeping with her task, each of Jeffrey’s sections touches on a diverse 
array of arguments. She seems determined to provide her readers with 
a cursory summary of any argument that clears a modest threshold of 
prominence in the contemporary literature. She does her best to provide 
an architectonic account of these arguments, and this is itself an aid to the 
book’s intended audience.
For example, in the section on normativity, Jeffrey begins by sorting 
arguments about God and normativity into three groups, based on the 
normative concept they foreground: objective value (i.e., moral facts), cate-
gorical obligation, or goodness. Each of the resulting sub-sections recounts 
a number of arguments, back and forth. So, for moral facts, the dialectic 
goes like this: you might think moral facts require a transcendent ground; 
but what about the queerness of such purported facts?; OK, but can we get 
clear about when and why a fact is too “queer” to accept?; perhaps not, 
but do moral facts even require a ground? Jeffrey adds a few closing com-
ments, and it’s on to the next subsection. Between the density of Jeffrey’s 
exposition and her constantly shifting focus, the material demands more 
concentration than most journal articles (the discussion of the “No Source” 
objection—new to me—was particularly challenging). It’s a little exhaust-
ing, if you read too much of it at a go. Still, both Jeffrey’s schema and dialec-
tical exposition are instructive. If I were teaching a course in philosophy of 
religion, and wanted to include the topic of God and normativity, Jeffrey’s 
overview would supply me not only with subtopics and a bibliography, 
but also with an organizational plat for discussing these matters over one 
or more sessions. (And likewise for each of the other sections.)
Unsurprisingly, not every major argument in the literature can be made 
to fit Jeffrey’s schemata. I am of two minds about the wisdom of Jeffrey’s 
(or perhaps her editor’s) decision about how to handle this—which was, 
again, to say something about every argument that clears a certain thresh-
old of current prominence. Thus the section on God and normativity 
concludes with a couple of paragraphs on “postmodernist” objections 
to ontotheology (which would, if accepted, undercut all the apologetic 
arguments Jeffrey has been considering) and a couple of pages on Mark 
Murphy’s explanans-driven argument about God’s relationship to moral 
reality. Neither discussion can begin to motivate the view in question; all 
they can do is note the existence of such views and sketch them briefly. 
Also, neither argument fits tidily into Jeffrey’s schema for this section. 
Something is achieved: a reader unfamiliar with Murphy’s recent work 
(say) would become aware of a novel argument she might wish to explore. 
This kind of thing makes Jeffrey’s book less book-like, though, and more 
like a reference work. I’m not sure this is a complaint. It’s more an obser-
vation on the inevitable consequences of a judgment call.
The same judgment call (“summarize everything and schematize it 
as best you can”) also frustrates the typical strategy of a philosophical 
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reviewer. I could engage with Jeffrey’s discussions of any of a dozen argu-
ments. And these arguments are the main business of the book. But the 
arguments Jeffrey considers are not the through line of the book.
O.K. I can’t resist commenting on one particular discussion. (It’s what 
we philosophical reviewers do, and I’m especially interested in the argu-
ment in question.) In her final section, Jeffrey gives comparatively exten-
sive attention to an argument by Kyla Ebels-Duggan about the conditions 
on what we might call “moral hope.” If (as many have thought) “some 
actions . . . are so bad as to be absolutely morally prohibited” but there 
are also some outcomes “that are so bad we should do everything in our 
power to prevent them,” then we could face dilemmas between the right 
and the good, dilemmas in which we must “perform an action that seems 
morally prohibited, or [permit] an outcome that also seems morally prohib-
ited” (56, emphasis Jeffrey’s). And that could lead to despair—certainly 
for anyone trapped in such a dilemma, and perhaps even for someone 
who recognizes this as a possibility.
(I wrote the preceding paragraph before the COVID-19 pandemic hit. It 
has a visceral immediacy now, for anyone who has read the testimonies of 
emergency workers in Italy.)
The way Jeffrey initially describes these dilemmas, she seems to be 
thinking of them as formally irresolvable. If there are “absolutely prohib-
ited actions” and “absolutely prohibited outcomes,” and no preestablished 
harmony prevents them from coming into conflict, then one could find 
oneself in circumstances in which “one must do something . . . prohibited” 
(57). Nothing, in such circumstances, would count as doing the right thing. 
But Ebels-Duggan and other Kant-inspired theorists who introduce these 
concerns would regard this way of framing the issue as unsatisfactory. No 
Kantian would endorse the notion of a “prohibited outcome.” (Nor should 
anyone, I think.) And if there are not literally “prohibited outcomes,” then 
these are not irresolvable dilemmas. They are “merely” moral horrors. The 
moral thing to do is clear. But it has ghastly consequences.
The dilemma remains, though, even if it is not irresolvable; and after 
her first attempt to set up the dilemma, Jeffrey articulates it in less strict—
but no less gripping—terms. “No one walks away from that kind of choice 
unmarred,” she writes (57). Again, think of the choices faced by health-
care workers in the face of disasters like Hurricane Katrina or a rising 
pandemic.
Assume I’m right about how these dilemmas should be understood. 
I’m not sure how the argument proceeds from there. Is the possibility of 
someday facing such a dilemma supposed to drive every reflective person 
to despair? Or is it that we all face such dilemmas, if we have the eyes to 
see, and so we all have grounds for despair? (Might someone rationally 
hope to be lucky enough never to face such a dilemma, and not despair 
preemptively?)
Jeffrey’s most compelling formulations put the worry in terms of 
the deep uncertainty of general convergence (the “happy coincidence”) 
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between right action and good consequences. This, naturally, is where 
thinkers like Ebels-Duggan (and Jeffrey, and I) turn to God. If one posits a 
God who providentially orders the world so that the righteous flourish—
if only “in the end’—then righteousness is not undercut by despair. Then 
one can carry on in hope.
I have allowed myself to delve into this argument, one of perhaps (I 
should have counted) fifty in this slim book, partly because I find it intrigu-
ing and there were specific points I  wanted to notice, partly because it 
highlights the inherent difficulty of Jeffrey’s enterprise. A book like this, if 
it is to be both slender and comprehensive, must often be telegraphic. And 
this was one of Jeffrey’s more extensive discussions.
But this argument, or its conclusion, also highlights the actual through 
line of the book, the argument about the comparative philosophical inter-
est of thin and thick theisms (say that ten times, fast). It is this, if anything, 
that makes the book more than an intelligently arranged catalog of availa-
ble views. Jeffrey’s overarching argument, as I noted early on, is a cumula-
tive-case argument, meant to emerge from her separate discussions of the 
dozens of other arguments she considers. It remains only to say a bit more 
about the overarching argument.
Jeffrey defines “thin theism” in her opening pages as any theism that 
“claims no more about God than that God is the God of the Abrahamic 
traditions . . . or that God is the omniGod of perfect being theology” (2). 
This is a loose characterization, and Jeffrey knows it. That’s not a problem, 
though, because it’s not Jeffrey’s project to get clear on the lineaments of 
“thin theism” or, as she puts it later, “least-common-denominator . . . the-
ism” and then evaluate this view. Though her talk of “thin theism” could 
lead some readers to suppose that she has a definite view in mind, or a 
cluster of views with shared elements, she’s not interested in defining the 
term and putting it to work. It would be truer to her project—if it were 
not awkward—to talk in exclusively scalar terms. Thinness and thickness 
are opposed directions on a scale, and her point can be restated thus: the 
thinner your theism—the less richly worked-out and potentially contro-
versial your conception of God—the less likely that the existence of that 
God would make an important difference in stabilizing aspects of your 
metaethical views.
Consider again Ebels-Duggan’s argument about the conditions on 
moral hope. Hope for the happy coincidence would seem to be rational on 
some presuppositions but not on others. Does the premise that there is a 
maximally perfect being (specified no further) imply that right action and 
good consequences won’t come tragically apart, that the sufferings of the 
righteous will somehow be redeemed? It’s hard to see how. It could imply 
this only with the addition of multiple controversial premises.
Therein lies the worry some will feel, presented with Jeffrey’s argu-
ment. Aren’t there reasons for philosophers to stick to thinner theisms 
when doing philosophy of religion? The more specific the conception of 
God a philosopher works with, the less widespread agreement she can 
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expect about the correctness of that conception. If we take Jeffrey’s advice, 
won’t we be “creat[ing] even more silos within philosophy of religion” 
(65)? Jeffrey thinks not. If the danger with silos is that they isolate us from 
one another, how much more isolating to converse with religious others 
without owning up to what either of us really believe, outside the philos-
ophy room? Interreligious understanding seems likelier to come from a 
fusion of horizons than from an attempt to say as little as possible.
I concur with Jeffrey about this almost entirely. Almost. Reading the 
closing pages of this closely argued book, I  found myself thinking of 
C.S. Lewis’s famous image of different (Christian) traditions as rooms in 
a boarding house. The “mere Christianity” of his title he likened to the 
main hall, off which the rooms open. “But it is in the rooms,” he writes, 
“not the hall, that there are fires and chairs and meals.” Sage words. And 
yet: there was a point too in his writing a book titled Mere Christianity. As 
there might be a point in books and articles about “mere theism.” If it can 
be clarifying and instructive for believers to explore the ways in which 
they are different, it can be equally clarifying and instructive for them to 
explore the ways in which they are the same.
Jeffrey has done her peers a service in writing this book, which must 
have been demanding to compose. It’s not something everyone needs to 
read. But I don’t think there’s anything quite like it on the market. If you 
need what it offers, you’ll be glad to have it on your shelf.
(Thanks to the students in Houghton College’s spring philosophy 
colloquium—Anna Judd, Aaron Moore, Anna Nesemeier, Tyler Stetson, 
Elijah Tangenberg, Honus Wagner, and Josiah Wiedenheft—for reading 
and discussing Jeffrey’s book, and a draft of this review, with me. Thanks 
to Kyla Ebels-Duggan for helpful discussion about her argument in “The 
Right, the Good, and the Threat of Despair.”)
Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment, by John Pittard. Oxford 
University Press, 2020. Pp xiii + 339. $80 (hardcover).
KIRK LOUGHEED, The University of Johannesburg.
John Pittard’s book, Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment 
marks a significant contribution to both epistemology and the philosophy 
of religion. The book is excellent and those working in these fields would 
do well to engage with it. The problem Pittard addresses is that of religious 
disagreement: Suppose Sally believes some religious proposition, say, that 
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